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4Soldiers of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division on the 
road during the advance on Ispica, 12 July 1943.
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5Abstract: Canada’s role in the Battle 
for Sicily is usually overshadowed 
by Anglo-American tensions and 
German assertions that they were the 
real victors. The green 1st Canadian 
Division was supposed to play a 
supporting role alongside veteran 
British and American formations, 
but found themselves at the centre 
of events. Canada’s contingent 
destroyed elements of every major 
Axis formation on the island and 
contributed significantly to the Allied 
capture of Sicily which broke Fascist 
power in Rome.
This year’s seventieth anniversary commemoration of Canada’s 
contribution to the 1943 invasion of 
Sicily is a worthy time to reflect on 
why it matters. Operation Husky, 
as the Allied collective effort was 
code-named, constituted the largest 
international military air, sea and 
land operation in history and turned 
the tide of the Second World War 
irreversibly in the Allies’ favour. 
It marked the end of a three year 
struggle to contain Axis expansion 
while the Allies mobilized, built, and 
trained the massive forces necessary 
to return to Axis-occupied Europe. 
Canadians formed a large portion 
of the Allied invasion force and 
played a pivotal role in the victorious 
38-day struggle for the island, but 
their voices were drowned out by 
those louder and more numerous in 
Germany, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. What follows here 
is an effort to re-consider Canada’s 
part in Operation Husky.1 
In June 1943, when the Canadian 
contingent sailed from Great Britain 
bound for Sicily the Royal Canadian 
Navy had been fighting German 
U-boats for three long years. Royal 
Canadian Air Force personnel had 
helped thwart a German invasion 
of Great Britain in 1940-41 and by 
1943 were carrying the bomber war 
to the heart of Germany. Only the 
Canadian Army still waited; coiled 
up and anxious to join the fight. 
Of course blood had been spilled 
at Hong Kong in 1941 and Dieppe 
in 1942 demonstrating Canada’s 
commitment to the Allied cause, but 
it remained to be seen whether the 
nation’s Great War reputation for 
military effectiveness would carry 
through to the Second World War. 
First Canadian Army trained and 
waited in England, held together for 
the invasion of France postponed 
until 1944. Meanwhile, British 
and other Commonwealth forces 
had been fighting German and 
Italian armies in the Mediterranean 
region since 1940. By early 1943 the 
Canadian government, people, and 
senior Army leadership could wait 
no longer to get their soldiers into 
the fight. Senior British commanders 
granted Ottawa’s request to find a 
place for a Canadian Army contingent 
in the next scheduled Mediterranean 
operation.2 
The inexperienced and unproven 
1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st 
Canadian Army Tank Brigade were 
assigned supporting roles in plans to 
invade Sicily, second to battle-tested 
British and American formations 
fresh from victory in North Africa. 
RCAF bomber and fighter squadrons 
along with RCN landing craft flotillas 
rounded out Canada’s contribution 
to the great armada bound for the 
central Mediterranean. Once the 
invasion began on 10 July 1943 a 
chain of events and decisions thrust 
the newcomer Canadians to centre-
stage, ready or not. Five days into 
Operation Husky British Eighth 
Army’s renowned commander, 
General Sir Bernard Montgomery, 
ordered 1st Canadian Division to 
make haste for the mountainous 
central province of Enna in search of 
the weak point between Axis forces 
gathering in eastern Sicily and those 
believed to be remaining in the west.3 
Montgomery’s controversial order 
resulted in 23 consecutive days of 
violent clashes amid rugged hills 
and rolling grain fields, culminating 
around the ancient mountaintop 
towns of Agira, Regalbuto, and 
Centuripe. During those days 1st 
Canadian Division alongside 231st 
British “Malta” Brigade and 1st US 
Division broke the centre of the 
Axis defence. By 7 August, combat 
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6losses, Benito Mussolini’s arrest, and 
mounting tension with their Italian 
allies forced the German garrison to 
commence an evacuation. The defeat 
foiled German hopes to delay an 
Allied conquest of Sicily long enough 
for fall weather to postpone Fascist 
Italy’s collapse and Allied landings 
in southern Europe for another year. 
Instead, German forces pre-emptively 
turned on their Italian allies and took 
over the defence of southern Europe, 
transferring large numbers of men, 
tanks, guns, and planes from other 
theatres.4 In short, Allied plans to 
conquer Sicily as a base, remove Italy 
from the war, and draw German 
resources away from Russia and 
France to southern Europe succeeded. 
Canada’s contingent played no small 
part in these outcomes. 
Canada’s unanticipated leading 
role is Sicily remains little known in 
part because the story is often carved 
into small regimental pieces. Not 
long after the battle, J.B. Conacher, 
1st Division’s official historian, wrote 
that Canada’s “campaign consisted 
of a series of brigade ‘shows’ and 
usually the brigade in action only 
committed one battalion at a time.” 
Conacher’s message referred mostly 
to the dispersed nature of fighting in 
a vast mountainous battlefield,5 but 
his message rings true in Canadian 
histories of Sicily which generally 
feature the small shows at the 
expense of the wider program. 
Farley Mowat made the Hastings 
and Prince Edward Regiment’s cliff 
scaling at Assoro famous in Canadian 
literature. Other regimental histories 
likewise capture clan accounts, like 
that of Princess Patricia’s Canadian 
Light Infantry in Leonforte, the Royal 
Canadian Regiment at Nissoria, or the 
Royal 22e Régiment at Catenanuova.6 
Indeed, the heroism, high drama, and 
tragedy experienced by famous units 
made it easy to lose sight of how they 
collectively contributed to the global 
war in 1943 and the first major land 
offensive against Hitler’s “Fortress 
Europe” of the Second World War.7
 Canada’s story in Sicily is also 
buried in an international history of 
Anglo-American friction, particularly 
between British Eighth Army’s 
Sir Bernard Montgomery and the 
United States Seventh Army’s 
George Patton.8 Many believe that 
this dysfunctional alliance frustrated 
total victory and let the Germans 
escape from Sicily in August 1943 in 
their equivalent to the British 1940 
evacuation from France at Dunkirk. 
English language histories near 
unanimously contend that after the 
Allies landed with overwhelming 
force, fighting in Sicily amounted to a 
skilful German delaying withdrawal 
which repeatedly foiled a shoddy 
Allied pursuit. 9 Rick Atkinson 
recently summed up the prevailing 
view that “barely fifty thousand 
Germans had overcome Allied air 
and sea supremacy, and the virtual 
collapse of their Italian confederates, 
General view of “Roger” and “Sugar” Beaches, the landing 
site of 1st Canadian Division during the invasion of Sicily, 
10 July 1943.
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to hold off an onslaught by nearly 
half a million Anglo-Americans for 
five weeks.”10 The result was a clean 
German getaway across the Straights 
of Messina to mainland Italy to fight 
another day which “doomed the Allies 
to a prolonged battle of attrition up 
the bloody Italian peninsula.”11 Even 
Montgomery grumbled at Allied 
inability to prevent the German 
escape “when we had complete air 
and naval supremacy.”12 
Not  surpris ingly ,  German 
commanders who served on Sicily 
were the loudest advocates of this 
view. German accounts devalued 
the Allied final victory by insisting 
that  Sici ly was impossible  to 
defend in the face of overwhelming 
Allied superiority. General Hans-
Valentin Hube, the German ground 
commander on Sicily, considered 
his mission hopeless before it 
even began.13 General Max Ulich, 
commander of the 29th Panzer 
Grenadier Division, claimed that 
Allied forces outnumbered German 
units by 8:1.14 His calculations did not 
include the 200,000 Italian soldiers on 
Sicily. Ulich and most other German 
commanders dismissed the Italians’ 
value claiming that they “virtually 
never gave battle” and that “90% of 
the Italian army are cowards who do 
not want to fight.”15 On the surface, 
the surrender of 130,000 Italian 
soldiers in Sicily, many after offering 
only token resistance, affirmed 
German complaints.16 Germany’s 
military leadership realized that 
Italy would probably break in 1943, 
leaving German units trapped on 
Italy’s islands and mainland. General 
Walter Warlimont, the deputy chief 
of the operations staff of the German 
high command (OKW), thought 
it best to abandon Sicily sooner 
rather than later. Hitler insisted field 
commanders be prepared ultimately 
to evacuate Sicily and indeed, most 
of Italy.17 Somehow Germany’s 
successful evacuation turned defeat 
in Sicily into a defensive victory. 
History’s preoccupation with 
Germany’s evacuation from Sicily 
does not explain the campaign’s 
middle phase from 13 July to 6 
August 1943. During those three 
weeks German forces on Sicily 
doubled in size and most of the 
Italian garrison remained in action 
and together they fought to hold 
Sicily. Desertions in some Sicilian 
coastal militia units and Italy’s final 
surrender should not overshadow 
the fact that Italian soldiers, sailors, 
and aircrew did much of the fighting 
and dying for the Axis in Sicily.18 
Allied units battled mixed Italian 
and German formations until the last 
week of the fighting. Italian numbers 
and firepower made the Axis defence 
possible. Only in August, after the 
Allies unloaded and concentrated all 
available forces in northeast Sicily did 
the Allies significantly outnumber 
their opponents on the ground. 
During the critical three weeks from 
15 July to 6 August, the Canadians 
fought their toughest actions against 
a staunch Axis defence between 
Enna and Catania. Their experience 
contradicts German explanations of 
what happened on Sicily.
An Italian coastal gun captured by the Canadians near Pachino.
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8In fact the Germans had little 
choice but to defend Sicily. The capture 
of the island and establishment 
of an Allied base in the central 
Mediterranean would threaten 
the entire south coast of Europe. 
Allied leaders agreed that attacking 
sovereign Italian territory in Sicily 
was the next logical blow in the effort 
to topple Mussolini’s unpopular 
government and remove Italy from 
the war.19 An Italian exit would force 
the Germans to move forces from 
more important fronts to protect 
southern Europe’s long coastline. In 
1943, the Italian army, naval, and air 
forces defended the Mediterranean 
region with 1,700,000 men in 
uniform.20 Even if German leaders 
mistrusted Italy’s commitment to the 
Axis, they could not replace Italy’s 
armed forces. German plans for a 
major offensive on the Russian front 
at Kursk in 1943 depended on the 
Italians carrying the main burden 
of defending the Mediterranean 
coast.21 Generals Albert Kesselring 
and Frido von Senger und Etterlin, 
Hitler’s commanders responsible 
for protecting Europe’s south coast, 
understood that “the Germans could 
not fight two opponents – the Allies 
and the defecting Italians.”22 For 
Germany, the Axis alliance had to 
continue as long as possible making 
it necessary to hold on to Sicily.
Although Axis leaders suspected 
Sicily was the next Allied target in 
1943 they could not be sure, leaving 
them little choice but to disperse 
their forces to defend the entire 
Mediterranean coast. What they 
mustered for Sicily included the 
equivalent of seven Italian reserve 
coastal defence divisions totalling 
some 100,000 men. The garrison’s 
mainstay were four regular Italian 
infantry divisions including 4th 
Livorno, 54th Napoli, 26th Assietta, 
and 28th Aosta Infantry Divisions 
reinforced with artillery and tank 
units borrowed from other regular 
Italian divisions, along with base 
troops and anti-aircraft gunners 
totalling another 100,000. The most 
mobile and best equipped defenders 
were the German 15th Panzer 
Grenadier and Hermann Goering 
Panzer Divisions numbering over 
30,000 troops. German and Italian 
units drew on the large Axis military 
base complex still on Sicily after three 
years of war in the Mediterranean 
region. That included 30,000 German 
Luftwaffe support troops, supply 
depots, signals stations, anti-aircraft 
batteries and ground crews added 
to Axis capability. All Axis forces on 
Sicily nominally fell under command 
of General Alfredo Guzzoni’s Sixth 
Italian Army although German 
units also took orders from a parallel 
national command system under 
the senior German liaison officer 
Lieutenant-General von Senger.23 
The Axis force was sub-divided 
into 12th Italian Corps in western 
Sicily and 16th Italian Corps in the 
eastern half. In both areas coastal 
defence units, made up largely of 
Sicilian militiamen, spread a thin 
perimeter defence and early warning 
screen along all potential landing 
beaches. Behind that perimeter 
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9Guzzoni  s tat ioned 16  mobi le 
battlegroups of tanks, motorcyclists, 
machine gun companies ,  and 
anti-tank gun batteries to protect 
airfields and to deliver immediate 
counterattacks once Allied landings 
were detected. Neither the coastal 
militia nor the mobile groups were 
expected to stop an Allied invasion. 
Instead they were a kind of speed 
bump to disrupt Allied landings and 
delay their assembly ashore to buy 
time for regular Italian and German 
divisions to mount a counteroffensive 
after the Allies revealed their landing 
sites. General Guzzoni felt the Allies 
would land on the wide beaches in 
southeastern Sicily and that all six 
Axis main force divisions should 
concentrate a decisive counter-
stroke there. But Guzzoni submitted 
to German fears of simultaneous 
landings either near Catania on 
the east coast, Gela in the south, or 
Marsala near Palermo in the west 
and northwest respectively. He 
allowed 26th Assietta, 28th Aosta 
Infantry Divisions and 15th Panzer 
Grenadier Division to move west 
and cover Palermo and Trapani. 
An eastern counterattack force was 
formed by 4th Livorno, 54th Napoli, 
and Hermann Goering Division. 
Guzzoni and von Senger understood 
the Allies would be weak in the first 
48 hours of battle as they unloaded 
men and material from ship to shore. 
They hoped that a concentrated Axis 
counterattack with tanks in those first 
critical days might isolate and defeat 
part of the Allied landing force and 
then move to the next.24 
In the Allied camp, the final 
Operation Husky plan was shaped 
by commanders who appreciated 
the dangers of landing on a hostile 
shore revealed by the 1942 Dieppe 
experience and who had experienced 
an aggressive Axis defence in Tunisia. 
None could be certain about how 
the enemy might react when Allied 
troops waded ashore on Sicily. 
Italian and German forces might 
resist ferociously together or the 
former might quit while the Germans 
abandoned the central Mediterranean 
and retreated to the Alps. Anything 
between these two extremes was 
possible. Italian units fought well in 
Tunisia in the spring of 1943, revealing 
improvements in equipment, supply, 
and combat effectiveness. While 
Operation Husky was calculated to 
collapse the Fascist regime, no one 
could guess how long Royal Italian 
Army units would fight on their 
own soil before politics intervened 
and a truce was reached. It was also 
impossible to predict how many 
enemy divisions could shift to Sicily 
if the Axis chose to make a stand 
there as they did in Tunisia.25 General 
Montgomery was perhaps the most 
famous voice calling for caution, but 
in the face of so many unknowns 
Allied commanders agreed to a 
plan that guaranteed victory even 
if the Italians and Germans reacted 
determinedly with all their available 
forces in the central Mediterranean.26 
The Allies concentrated forces in 
southeastern Sicily for mutual 
protection and security. The central 
principle linking the air, sea, and 
land plans was delivering the assault 
force to the beaches alive, capturing 
Axis air bases in the southeast, and 
then turning the beachhead into 
an fortress in time to receive the 
expected counter-offensive. Beyond 
that, it was difficult to make plans 
until the enemy showed his hand.27 
The Allied amphibious task 
forces, including the Canadians, 
loaded into transports prepared to 
battle hard for the beach and then 
against an Axis counter-offensive. 
Fighting troops, weapons, and 
ammunition took priority in the 
assault convoys. Eighth Army’s 
divisions sailed with an assault 
scale of vehicles (890 of their full 
establishment of 3,000), which was 
enough to fight and re-supply to 
about 16 kilometres from shore. 
Follow-on convoys would land more 
vehicles around D+2 enabling some 
deeper penetration inland, but the 
full balance of vehicles and heavy 
engineer equipment would not arrive 
until two weeks after the beachhead 
was secure and the deep water port at 
Syracuse open for business. Infantry 
battalions organized to function with 
75 vehicles brought 29 on D-Day.28 
In light of experience fighting Axis 
counteroffensive moves, the loading 
arrangements seemed sound. 
Convoy routes to Sicily ran 
through enemy-infested sea and 
air space. Axis naval and air forces 
remained powerful in 1943. German 
U-boats infiltrated the Canadian 
convoy during the night of 4/5 
July and struck two transports 
with torpedoes. A third went up 
in flames the next afternoon. Fifty-
five Canadians died on the three 
vessels along with merchant navy 
crewmen. The divisional artillery lost 
40 guns and tractors and most of its 
headquarters equipment. Over half 
of the division’s vehicles, some 500 
of all shapes and sizes combat loaded 
with stores, went to the bottom of the 
Mediterranean, slashing the already 
tight assault scale. Royal Canadian 
Army Service Corps truck fleets and 
the divisional headquarters were 
hardest hit. Equipment lost could 
not be replaced from stocks in the 
United Kingdom until at least D+42, 
the forecast termination of Operation 
Husky.29 It was fortunate then that 
1st Canadian Division had the easiest 
D-Day assignment. 
The Husky plan assigned Eighth 
Army’s three British divisions backed 
by air assault troops and commandos 
to land south of Syracuse and grab the 
ancient port intact. The 1st Canadian 
Division would guard their left 
wing by landing on the Pachino 
Peninsula and capturing the airfield. 
US Seventh Army’s three assault 
divisions, along with Ranger and 
parachute units, would land across 
the Gulf of Gela on the south coast. 
Their main mission was to seize 
airfields in the broad Gela and Acate 
valleys and the commanding heights 
above them where General Patton 
6
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planned to meet the enemy counter-
strike.30 After winning the beachhead 
battle, General Montgomery expected 
his three British divisions to turn 
north and drive on Catania and 
the neighbouring Gerbini airbase 
complex before carrying on to 
Messina and cutting the Axis link to 
mainland Italy. General Patton would 
land a fourth American division 
and advance to central Sicily to 
engage Axis forces left intact after 
the opening battles, including those 
in western Sicily.31 After securing 
their beaches and Pachino airfield, 
the Canadian mission was to guard 
the British inland shoulder and 
link up with the Americans in the 
most remote part of the assault 
area, the least likely to see an Axis 
counterattack. 
Despi te  losses  at  sea  and 
tumultuous weather the day before 
the invasion, events unfolded much 
as both sides anticipated. Italian 
patrol aircraft and coastal defence 
units served their warning function, 
triggering the march of Axis mobile 
forces to the south and east coasts. 
Neither Guzzoni nor von Senger 
calculated that the Allies could or 
would simultaneously land seven 
reinforced divisions massed in 
southeastern Sicily. With just three 
main force divisions in the east 
they only had strength to strike the 
Americans at Gela. Guzzoni launched 
4th Livorno and Hermann Goering 
Divisions into the attack immediately. 
Guzzoni also ordered Major-General 
Eberhard Rodt’s veteran 15th Panzer 
Grenadier Division to rush to central 
Sicily from the west and join in the 
battle. Guzzoni hoped the stronger 
coastal defences around Syracuse-
Augusta fortress complex could hold 
on against the British.32
In the vulnerable first days, 
13th British and 2nd US Corps 
and attached airborne forces bore 
the brunt of fighting north and 
west of the Canadian area. For 
two days Ital ian and German 
armoured and motorized infantry 
forces counterattacked US Seventh 
Army’s beachhead at Gela, only to be 
smashed by US 1st Infantry Division 
and Allied naval gunfire. Smaller 
Italian units counterattacked or tried 
blocking British landing forces. While 
there were tense moments and heavy 
losses for some British and US units, 
the beach defences were overcome 
and Axis counterattacks defeated 
more quickly than anticipated. 
British 5th Infantry and 1st Airborne 
Divisions aided by commandos and 
the Royal Navy destroyed Italian 
counterattacks and captured the 
port installations at Syracuse intact 
by early evening on D-Day.33 In the 
Canadian sector assault battalions 
engaged in a few sharp fights with 
Italian coastal defence units around 
the Pachino airfield complex, but 
their area stood isolated from Axis 
bases and road networks and thus 
met only a few small counterattacks, 
none backed by substantial armoured 
forces. The 1st Canadian Division 
then advanced to the northwest 
before dawn on D+1, following the 
plan to anchor the beachhead along 
the ridge overlooking the Pachino 
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Peninsula. Canadian vanguard 
columns won the towns of Pozzallo, 
Ispica, and Rosolini commanding 
that ridge face by midday.34 The 206th 
Italian Coastal Division and the two 
Italian mobile groups that covered 70 
kilometres of Eighth Army’s landing 
beach were overwhelmed. Two 
thousand were captured in the first 36 
hours and an unknown number killed 
by naval and aerial bombardment. 
The survivors withdrew towards 
their base at Modica or to the inland 
hills alongside 54th Napoli Division.35 
By 12 July commanders on both 
sides contemplated what to do next. 
Events hinged on what looked like 
a thinly defended road to Catania 
and Messina, manned by weak 
enemy forces. It appeared to General 
Montgomery that day that his troops 
destroyed, captured, or drove off 
Italian units in their area faster 
than anticipated. Most German 
troops were located further west. 
Hermann Goering Panzer Division 
was fighting the Americans within 
sight of the Gela beaches and 15th 
Panzer Grenadier Division was 
reportedly moving there too.36 In 
that light Montgomery made a bold 
decision. Despite vehicle shortages he 
ordered the infantry and tanks of 13th 
British Corps to dash up the coast 
on Highway 114 to Catania. These 
conventional forces had help from 
British No.3 Commando who landed 
ahead of them to grab the Lentini 
River bridge north of that town. 
The Parachute Brigade dropped 
to secure the heights and bridge at 
Primosole along the Simeto River.37 
The roads along their path were few 
in number. Only the coastal Highway 
114 was paved and sturdy enough 
for heavy two-way military traffic. 
Montgomery and his staff calculated 
that was only enough to carry the two 
British divisions in 13th Corps, even 
with their vehicle shortages.38 
In light of the cramped road 
network Montgomery ordered 
Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese, 
commanding 30th Corps, to form 
Harpoon Force. This partly motorized 
column based on 23rd British 
Armoured Brigade and 231st Malta 
Brigade was ordered to drive inland 
to cut the east-west Highway 124 at 
Vizzini. That much was expected, 
but Montgomery added a twist by 
ordering Harpoon Force to turn 
west at Vizzini and keep going along 
Highways 124 and 117 to Enna. 
Those two-way roads and the major 
transportation junctions around Enna 
were assigned to US Seventh Army 
as part of its mission to cut Sicily 
in half. Montgomery asked for and 
received permission from General Sir 
Harold Alexander, the overall Allied 
ground commander, to take those 
roads and that mission for his own 
30th British Corps. That the decision 
strained Anglo-American relations 
in Sicily is an understatement, but 
is worth remembering that it made 
sense on 12 July. That day most the 
German garrison and three of four 
regular Italian divisions were locked 
in close combat with or moving 
The Gela River plain, epicentre of Axis counter-attacks from D-Day to D+2.
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towards the Americans in southern 
central Sicily. Reconnaissance aircraft 
reported no sign of the enemy 
moving east towards the British. It 
looked like a rapid British armoured 
thrust northwest to Enna might trap 
the enemy main force against the 
Americans and cut them off from 
the small Italo-German force in the 
east. The enemy lying in the path of 
the main British 13th Corps thrust to 
Catania seemed to amount only to 
pieces of 54th Napoli Division and 
a German regimental battlegroup 
under command of Colonel Wilhelm 
Schmalz.39 That day Montgomery 
signalled to General Alexander that 
“once my left (30th) Corps reaches 
area LEONFORTE-ENNA the enemy 
opposing the Americans will never 
get away.”40
Montgomery directed 51st 
Highland Division to closely follow 
Harpoon Force while 1st Canadian 
Division, the junior formation in 
30th Corps, was sidelined and 
ordered to hand over much of its 
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps 
divisional transport company to 
Harpoon Force. Having become the 
least motorized Allied force in Sicily, 
the Canadians continued marching 
inland with orders to capture 206th 
Italian Division’s headquarters at 
Modica before German units arrived 
in support. After that they were to 
link up with the Americans at Ragusa 
and keep walking north, screening 
Harpoon Force’s inland flank.41 US 
Seventh Army would do its part by 
taking on the majority of Italian and 
German units in Sicily already on 
their front or moving towards them.42 
In a sense, all was as it was supposed 
to be in the original Husky plan. 
Eighth Army was poised to strike 
north for Catania and Messina while 
the Americans engaged the main 
enemy force. Montgomery’s plan to 
trap that force made sense on 12 July 
even if it was poorly communicated 
to the Americans and assumed that 
no more Italian or German troops 
reinforced Sicily from mainland 
Europe.43 Of course Axis generals 
made their own decisions.
In the Axis camp, Generals 
Guzzoni, von Senger and Kesselring 
determined by 12 July that the 
Syracuse-Augusta naval fortress 
complex was in British hands, Axis 
counter-attacks at Gela failed, and 
eight Allied divisions were ashore. 
They therefore decided to fall back 
to a line running from the Catania 
Plain on the east coast to Leonforte in 
central Sicily and then to San Stefano 
on the north coast. This shorter line 
on defensible ground might hold 
with available troops and weapons, 
including the well-stocked supply 
base in the Catania-Gerbini complex 
and its fortress units.44 Hitler and the 
German senior staff sanctioned the 
decision and despatched German 
reinforcements to Sicily. The Italians 
agreed to do the same. Most of 
1st Parachute Division along with 
bomber and fighter squadrons moved 
immediately to Sicily or nearby 
mainland airfields. The 382nd Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment moved into 
Sicily that day and 29th Panzer 
Grenadier Division also made its way 
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down the Italian peninsula towards 
Sicily.  The Germans deployed 
additional heavy coastal artillery, 
anti-aircraft and engineer units to 
the Straits of Messina to turn the 
short ferry link between Sicily and 
the mainland into an unbreakable 
lifeline. Hitler instructed his men to 
“delay the advance of the Allies and 
then bring it to a standstill.”45 If Axis 
forces could not throw the Allies 
off Sicily they now had to hold the 
Allies there. As long as the frontline 
remained in Sicily, Mussolini’s Fascist 
regime might hold on, Italy’s armed 
forces might stay on side, and the 
Allies might be kept away from vital 
natural resources in the Balkans.46 
The first wave of 1st Parachute 
Division reinforcements dropped 
onto the Catania Plain on the night 
of 12 July. Battlegroup Schmalz 
swelled with the attachment of three 
German parachute battalions, fortress 
battalions and a large contingent of 
Italian troops all of whom dug in to 
hold south of Primosole Bridge and 
buy time for more German units to 
arrive in Sicily and for those in the 
west to move east. Eighth Army 
headquarters could not know of these 
developments, although they did 
get reports of German paratroopers 
landing on Sicily.47 
On Eighth Army’s inland wing 
Harpoon Force reached Vizzini 
early on 13 July where a stiff fight 
raged much of the day. British troops 
captured 54th Napoli Division’s 
commander by afternoon and 
believed they had won. Montgomery 
thought his manoeuvre plan was 
working and sent word to Alexander 
that night that his “general battle 
situation was excellent.”48 In fact 
Napoli Division and surviving 206th 
Coastal Division troops had not yet 
given up Vizzini and two Hermann 
Goering Division battalions arrived 
to assist them.49 Vizzini barred access 
to three key roads running down 
the Iblei Mountains to the Catania 
Plain. As long as they remained open 
Hermann Goering Division could 
escape from southern Sicily to the 
join the main Axis battle line forming 
at the edge of the plain.50 The Italian-
German force at Vizzini fought on 
through 14 July until 51st Highland 
Division arrived to envelope the 
naturally strong hilltop position. US 
45th National Guard Division closed 
in from the southwest. British troops 
won the town early on 15 July but 
by then Hermann Goering Division 
had escaped to the Catania Plain.51 
British reports oddly acknowledge 
only the presence of German troops at 
Vizzini, writing off the larger Italian 
force there as a “few miscellaneous 
detachments.” In contrast  the 
Americans always identified which 
Italian units they engaged, including 
54th Napoli Division at Vizzini.52 
Fighting also flared at the southern 
edge of the Catania Plain where 
British commando and parachute 
troops landed in a hornet’s nest. The 
A formation of US Army Air Force B-25 Mitchells and P-38 Lightnings engage an 
axis air convoy during the struggle for air superiority prior to Operation Husky.
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small band of elite British soldiers 
were caught between Group Schmalz 
that they had bypassed, German 
parachute reinforcements landing in 
front of them, and Hermann Goering 
Division arriving from the southeast. 
53 The 13th British Corps advanced 
northward to even the odds. Confused 
fighting raged for three days as 
Group Schmalz fought to escape 
encirclement at Lentini and the rest 
of the Axis force repeatedly tried to 
recapture Primosole Bridge. Both of 
Montgomery’s daring 12 July moves 
collided with Axis plans to make a 
stand south of Catania. He reacted 
by cancelling the Harpoon Force 
mission and steering 51st Highland 
Division north from Vizzini to pursue 
the Goering Division and add British 
weight to the fight expanding on 
the Catania plain. History may have 
judged Montgomery less harshly 
had he also cancelled his request to 
take over Highways 124, 117, and 
Enna from the Americans. Nigel 
Hamilton, Montgomery’s well-
known biographer, condemned his 
subject for not giving back those 
routes because “the moment Harpoon 
Force failed to drive through Vizzini 
the whole logic of his strategy fell 
apart.” Hamilton argued that the 
Americans had more four-wheel 
drive trucks and were in a better 
position quickly drive inland to 
reach Enna and cut off Axis forces in 
western Sicily from those in the east.54 
In Montgomery’s view, coordinating 
manoeuvre along an international 
army boundary was too complicated. 
Better if Eighth Army maintained 
sole control over what seemed to be 
a quick battle to disrupt a German 
evacuation. Montgomery retained 
Highways 124 and 117 to keep his 
movement options open. There was 
still another German division to 
contend with in western Sicily.55 
Hamilton and other critics of 
Montgomery’s decision might be 
right, but the damage was already 
done. By 15 July Patton’s Seventh 
Army began shifting west towards 
Trapani and Palermo. For the next 
ten days the British fought in eastern 
Sicily while the Americans waged a 
separate battle to clear the western 
half. But some Allied formation 
still had to drive to central Sicily, 
capture Enna, and prevent Axis 
forces in western Sicily from joining 
the battle on the Catania Plain. 
The 1st Canadian Division was the 
only Eighth Army force available 
for the job and so began Canada’s 
greatest contribution to Operation 
Husky, made along the schism 
between Eighth British and Seventh 
US armies, literally and figuratively. 
Their mission to central Sicily was 
the bastard child of the “stolen 
road” inherited from the short-lived 
Harpoon Force. 
Orders for 1st Canadian Division 
to move arrived at the end of a 24-
hour rest on 13/14 July. Montgomery 
publicly praised Canadian potential 
but mused privately that they had 
“to be rested; the men were not fit 
and they suffered severely from the 
hot sun and many got badly burnt; 
generally, officers and men are too 
fat and they want to get some flesh 
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off and to harden themselves.”56 
Montgomery’s flippant and oft-
quoted diary entry created a 
Canadian historical inferiority 
complex. Certainly the Canadians 
came pale-skinned directly from 
Scotland to a Sicilian summer after 
a long sea voyage. Arguably, they 
proved their fitness level by marching 
45 kilometres inland to capture 
Modica and 206th Coastal Division 
headquarters by the morning of 
12 July. This was no small feat 
given their lack of transport – many 
of the few trucks they had being 
commandeered for Harpoon Force. 
In fact, Montgomery wanted all his 
divisions rested after long marches 
in blazing sun and heat even if some 
rest periods were cut short when 
the chance to manoeuvre presented 
itself on 12 and 13 July on the east 
coast.57 In the Canadian case, after 
capturing Modica and linking with 
the Americans in Ragusa there was 
little do on 13 July but recover from 
the long sea voyage and 48 hour 
march and to shuttle divisional 
supporting units up to their forward 
location around Giarratana. All 
that changed when heavy fighting 
at Vizzini, Lentini, and Primosole 
drew in all of Eighth Army except 
the Canadians. 
Fortunately, the new Canadian 
assignment arrived on 14 July, the 
same day convoys unloaded Eighth 
Army’s second wave of vehicles. 
Until then Canadian service corps 
troops supplied the division with 43 
of the 225 trucks they were supposed 
to have had even at assault scale.58 
But on that day Canadian truck 
platoons loaned to Harpoon Force 
were returned and Eighth Army 
found replacements for some of 
what was lost at sea. Canadian 
service corps troops scrounged other 
vehicles, borrowing or stealing them 
from British units. More still were 
captured from or donated by 206th 
Italian Coastal Division. Those came 
with willing Italian Army volunteers 
who revealed early clues about 
how many Italians were ready to 
join the Allied cause against Nazi-
Fascism.59 Second wave convoys also 
brought Royal Canadian Engineer 
trucks, bulldozers, and other heavy 
equipment vital for getting past 
the roadblocks, explosive traps, 
and demolitions that lay ahead on 
the road to Enna.60 Three Rivers 
Regiment Sherman tanks from 1st 
Canadian Army Tank Brigade and 
Bishop self-propelled 25-pounder 
guns from 142nd Field Regiment, 
Royal Canadian Artillery were 
attached to 1st Canadian Division to 
add to their mobility.61 Before dawn 
on 15 July the Canadian column was 
as motorized as it could be and on its 
way to Enna. 
Rich stories of Canadian actions 
in Sicily are well told elsewhere; 
the aim here is to review how 
they affect the wider campaign.62 
In the early morning of 15 July 
British troops advance in Sicily behind a Bishop self-propelled 25-pounder gun.
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the divisional vanguard set off 
including the Hastings and Prince 
Edward Regiment, a squadron of 
Three Rivers Regiment Shermans, 
a Saskatoon Light Infantry machine 
gun detachment along with towed 
anti-tank and self-propelled artillery. 
By 0900 hours they met a Hermann 
Goering-4th Livorno Division 
rearguard waiting in ambush in 
and south of Grammichele. At first 
all seemed to go badly. Enemy long 
range anti-tank guns, quad-mounted 
20 mm anti-aircraft guns, tanks, 
and mortars picked off a number of 
Canadian vehicles. What remains 
remarkable about Grammichele was 
how quickly the green Canadians 
assessed the enemy threat, formulated 
a workable plan and deployed 
aggressively to see it through. If the 
purpose of any rearguard is to slow 
down their pursuers by forcing them 
to halt and deploy for battle and then 
escape before suffering undue loss, 
the Axis rearguard at Grammichele 
achieved only the first goal. In three 
hours Hasty P rifle companies and 
Three Rivers Shermans enveloped 
the town and captured or destroyed 
two self-propelled quad-20mm guns, 
an 88 mm gun, and a troop of three 
tanks. Total German and Italian 
casualties are unknown but Private 
Huron Brant killed or captured at 
least thirty on his own. Canada lost 
three men killed and 22 wounded 
in the exchange.63 It seems probable 
that the Canadian column surprised 
the Axis rearguard by approaching 
from the east. The day and night 
before, the same Italian-German 
force faced southwest and fought off 
179th (Oklahoma) National Guard 
Regiment.64
The actions at Vizzini and 
Grammichele along with intercepted 
wireless messages provided General 
Montgomery’s staff with clues 
about enemy movement but no 
complete picture. Hermann Goering 
Division was obviously on its way 
to the Catania Plain and more of 
1st German Parachute Division 
arrived to reinforce Group Schmalz.65 
Instead of one German regimental 
group Eighth Army now faced the 
equivalent of two German divisions 
on the eastern Catania Plain. Both 
seemed hotly engaged by British 
13th Corps’ 5th and 50th Divisions 
around the Primosole Bridge sector. 
Things looked looser on the western 
or inland side of the Catania Plain. 
There 51st Highland Division seemed 
to be pressing on an open German 
inland wing. At that time Eighth 
Army staff wrote off all Italian units 
in eastern Sicily except for ineffective 
scattered remnants.66 In this light 
Montgomery ordered 51st Division 
to drive north from Vizzini onto 
the western Catania Plain, capture 
the Gerbini airfield complex and 
press on to Paternò at the foot of 
Mount Etna. Montgomery wanted 
the Highland Division to turn or 
at least extend the main German 
force on the eastern Catania Plain 
and possibly open a second route 
to Messina.67 On 15 July, it was 
still unclear whether the staunch 
German defence south of Catania 
covered an evacuation or if the enemy 
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planned to hold on in Sicily. The 
other unknown quantity was 12th 
Italian Corps with its 15th Panzer 
Grenadier Division still lurking to 
the west in the American sector. 
The Allies expected Italian troops in 
12th Corps to keep fighting against 
or to surrender to the Americans. 
Montgomery’s main concern was 
that 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 
would head east to join the Catania 
battle. His solution was to intercept 
them with 1st Canadian Division. 
Montgomery ordered General Leese, 
commanding 30th Corps, to “drive the 
Canadians on hard…to Caltagrione, 
and then to Valguarnera-Enna-
Leonforte.” General Leese passed the 
instructions to Major-General Guy 
Simonds, commanding 1st Canadian 
Division. “It is all the more vital for 
us to get on quickly…If opportunity 
occurs push a mobile mechanized 
force with tanks quickly through 
towards Enna.” If the Canadians 
met 15th Panzer Grenadier on route 
Leese warned Simonds that “all our 
experience in this island has been 
that if you are held up put in a well-
supported attack in strength.”68 So 
far Axis troops proved hard to catch 
or out-manoeuvre as they retreated 
through Sicily’s rugged hills. Only 
when Axis troops stopped to fight did 
opportunities arise to destroy them.
As 1st Canadian Division drove 
on its intercept course with the 
enemy, they drew closer to the 
American force destined to be their 
most important partner in Sicily. 
Most of US Seventh Army grudgingly 
obliged Montgomery’s plan and 
shifted units westward, except for 
Major-General Terry Allen’s 1st 
US Infantry Division driving north 
from Gela. General Patton diverted 
their path only slightly towards the 
sulphur mining and transport hub 
town of Caltanissetta, 20 kilometres 
west of Enna and on a parallel path 
with the Canadians.69 The partnership 
began when Allen’s 18th US Infantry 
Regiment attacked the Highway 
124-117 crossroads prior to handing 
over there to the Canadians. US 1st 
Division patrols discovered enemy 
positions covering the crossroads 
manned by an Italian infantry 
battalion and a battalion of 100 mm 
medium guns. The Americans caught 
the Italians unaware and brought 
down observed artillery fire into 
their midst before sweeping down to 
attack. Italian survivors pulled back 
northward after abandoning 11 guns, 
50 trucks, and 200 prisoners.70 The 
road junction seemed open by late 
afternoon on 15 July.
The 1st Canadian Division could 
not link up with the Americans 
until the next morning. Highway 
124 running from Grammichele 
Palermo, pictured here during a March 1943 US Army Air Force bombing mission, was the largest port and city on Sicily. 
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was blocked at Caltagirone. The 
ancient Greek city lay on a narrow, 
steep-sided plateau connecting the 
southeastern Iblei Mountains to the 
Erei Mountains in Sicily’s centre. 
Caltigirone’s topography made it an 
important road junction town and the 
base for the Hermann Goering and 
Livorno Divisions. Both attributes 
made Caltigirone an Allied bomber 
target. Toronto’s 48th Highlanders 
led the way into the half-demolished 
city of 40,000 inhabitants on the night 
of 15/16 July, encountering their first 
mass humanitarian disaster of the 
war. German engineers intensified 
the chaos by leaving behind mines, 
explosive-traps, and massive craters 
blown in all roads in and out of the 
city. Steep sided hills dropping away 
from the roads meant that traps 
could not be easily bypassed and 
had to be cleared. Booby-trapped 
demolitions killed the first two 
48th Highlanders lost in the Second 
World War.71 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Geoff Walsh’s divisional engineers 
had to open the bottleneck quickly. 
All the division’s bulldozers came 
forward to fill craters and move 
rubble. Bomb damage, raging fires, 
enemy traps, and the city’s precarious 
location made Caltagirone the worst 
roadblock encountered by any Allied 
division in Sicily. Walsh asked 51st 
Highland Division’s engineers to 
send their dozers to help. He also 
found 200 Italians prisoners willing to 
help clean up the broken city.72 
A rough bypass was ready for 
a Loyal Edmonton Regiment-based 
battlegroup to take the lead of the 
1st Canadian Division column early 
on 16 July. By then Lieutenant-
Colonel’s Len Pease, commander 
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, 
and Preston Gilbride, assistant 
adjutant and quartermaster general, 
had scrounged 53 trucks including 
33 large three-ton Bedfords, enough 
to motorize all infantry battalions in 
the lead brigade. That morning over 
3,000 men moved forward in a grand 
Canadian fighting convoy to join 
the Americans at Highway 117 and 
where they turned north to Enna.73 
 The Loyal Edmonton vanguard 
column rolled through 16 July 
pausing on occasion because of 
German “demolition and mine laying 
activities.” They met hundreds of 
Italian and German soldiers looking 
to surrender, including stragglers 
from the Gela battle and headquarters 
troops from the nearby base areas 
between Caltagirone and Piazza 
Armerina. The vanguard left these 
willing prisoners-to-be for others 
to round up and kept driving to 
the American-held Highway 117 
crossroads where they turned north. 
As the column negotiated its way 
down into a hollow across Highway 
117 five kilometres south of Piazza 
Armerina, the Loyal Eddies met 
what they called the “main German 
rearguard.” An intense gun fight 
developed across the hollow as Three 
Rivers Regiment tanks, and Loyal 
Eddie anti-tank guns and 3- inch 
mortars on the south side responded 
to German machine guns on the north 
side, blowing open the stone farm 
houses they fired from. Germans 
Infantry of the 48th Highlanders advancing through Sicily.
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mortar and artillery shells struck 
back, scoring direct hits on Canadian 
gun and mortar crews. Lieutenant-
Colonel Jim Jefferson deployed his 
rifle companies to attack the other 
side of the hollow on both sides of 
the road that bisects it.74 
It was too soon for the Canadians 
to realize who they were up against. 
They assumed that in front of them 
lay the same Goering Division 
rearguard evicted earlier from 
Grammichele.75 In fact the Loyal 
Eddies had met the eastern end 
of General Eberhard Rodt’s 15th 
Panzer Grenadier Division battle 
outpost line. The hills before them 
were manned by a battalion from 
Colonel Karl Ens’ 104th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment reinforced 
with German self-propelled guns as 
well as Italian 90 mm dual-purpose 
guns and heavy howitzers. Colonel 
Ens’ men had been waiting there 
for three days. The job of the 104th 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment was 
to defend a deep triangle from 
Piazza Armerina west to Barrafranca 
and north to Valguarnera. Livorno 
Division tanks and artillery and 16th 
Corps’ artillery reinforced Group 
Ens and held Aidone and Raddusa 
to the east, although not yet in a 
well-coordinated or cooperative 
fashion.76 The rest of 15th Division 
was deployed in an arch southwest 
of Enna at every substantial road 
junction town.77 If the Canadian 
mission was to advance to Enna 
to intercept 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division then they had found their 
quarry.
Collectively Group Ens and 
Livorno Division were to hold south 
of Enna so that 12th Italian Corps 
and the well-stocked ammunition 
and fuel depots at Palermo could 
be moved east. The mostly intact 
12th Italian Corps was to set up the 
northern wing of the Hauptkampflinie 
or main battle line from San Stefano 
on the north coast to Leonforte. 
Germany’s 29th Panzer Grenadier 
Division was on its way to join them 
from the mainland. Once those moves 
were complete 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division was to back up into its 
section of the line around the natural 
mountain fortress of Leonforte.78 
From San Stefano to Leonforte and 
east to Catania the German and 
Italian senior leadership agreed fight 
a protracted defensive battle. German 
goals remained the same: to keep 
Mussolini in power and Italy in the 
war by holding the Allies in Sicily.79 
On 16 July, before Italian and 
German forces were assembled 
and organized on the main battle 
line, von Senger saw the threat 
posed by 1st Canadian and US 1st 
Divisions driving towards Enna and 
Leonforte. He wrote: “The longer 
the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 
could remain in its present position 
the less likely was an encircling 
manoeuvre from the west in pursuit 
of the retreating Hermannn Goering 
Division.”80 Von Senger disregarded 
the composite Italian forces covering 
the gaps between German divisions. 
The mistrust between Italian and 
German generals was far worse 
than any Anglo-American friction. 
Nevertheless von Senger’s worries 
were justified as the Canadian-
American threat mounted along the 
seam between Axis formations in 
Sicily. The 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division had to defend south of 
Enna. More specifically Colonel Ens’ 
reinforced 104th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment must hold the Piazza 
Armerina-Barrafranca-Valguarnera 
triangle.
In that sense the Loyal Edmonton 
fight south of Piazza Armerina 
was only half the battle on 16 July. 
Ten kilometres west at Barrafranca 
US 1st Division’s 26th Regimental 
Combat Team met the western 
wing of Battlegroup Ens.81 The fight 
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Regiment confer during an attack near 
Valguarnera, 18 July 1943.
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for Barrafranca raged all day and 
reached a peak when Colonel Ens 
counterattacked the lead American 
battalion with a company of Panzer 
IVs. By the late afternoon US 1st 
Division brought their artillery 
into action and drove the German 
reinforced battalion off the field 
towards Valguarnera, leaving eight 
Panzer IVs burning behind them.82 
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment 
attacked into the hills south of Piazza 
Armerina that same afternoon, into 
terrain where their supporting 
Three Rivers tanks could not follow 
them. Lieutenant-Colonel Jefferson 
mustered only three of his four 
rifle companies giving the German 
battalion odds in this fight. Both 
attacker and defender were well 
backed by artillery and mortars. 
Nevertheless the Loyal Edmonton 
infantrymen prevailed by carrying 
the action across the hilltops and 
away from the road the Germans 
tried to block. By late afternoon the 
Eddies owned the hills commanding 
Piazza Armerina and the long 
crescent shaped valley in which it 
lays and the 2nd Battalion of 104th 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment and 
its attached German and Italian 
artillery withdrew to the hills north 
of town. The 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division’s report to Kesselring in 
the first week of Husky complained 
that “a special characteristic of the 
enemy manner of fighting is that he 
does not attack over open ground, but 
attacks through areas that provide 
cover while diminishing the efficacy 
of the tanks.”83 Crews from 70th US 
Tank Battalion and the Three Rivers 
Regiment might be forgiven for 
avoiding obvious prepared German 
anti-tank kill zones in open fields and 
along main roads, opting instead to 
support off road infantry attacks on 
German flanks.
The loss of Barrafranca and 
Piazza Armerina on 16 July forced 
General Rodt’s 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division into in a tighter circle 
protecting the approaches to Enna. 
Rodt pulled in his western-most unit, 
Colonel Fritz Fullriede’s 129th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment from demolition 
and delay work near Caltanisetta. As 
15th Division fell back it integrated 
survivors of Livorno Division re-
constituted into four battalion-
sized battlegroups deployed from 
Valguarnera eastward, along with 
General Rossi’s 16th Corps artillery. 
West of Enna, 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division had help from battalions 
from 26th Assietta, 28th Aosta, and 
207th Coastal Divisions along with a 
Bersaglieri Regiment to hold off 1st 
US Division.84 By now General Hans-
Valentin Hube had brought 14th 
Panzer Corps Headquarters to Sicily 
to take command of the battle from 
the Italians. Hube ordered General 
Rodt’s division to hold a new line of 
combat outposts south of Enna until 
the western anchor of the main battle 
line at Leonforte and Nicosia was 
prepared.85 
Allied commanders remained 
in the dark regarding German and 
Italian decisions at the end of 16 July. 
Signs still indicated the Germans were 
moving east in order to evacuate and 
that Italian units looked to surrender 
at the first opportunity. In that light 
most of Patton’s Seventh Army 
carried on towards Palermo and 
Trapani to capture those ports and 
finish off 12th Italian Corps believed 
to be standing passively in front of 
them.86 Montgomery also remained 
optimistic: “All indications are that 
the enemy is stretched and we should 
press him strongly with thrusts in all 
sectors.”87 Thus on 17 July all Allied 
units in Sicily drove northwards, 
spreading out from the landing areas 
like a fan, pursuing an enemy who 
seemed intent on escape. The next 72 
hours changed Allied assumptions 
and opened their eyes to the Battle 
of Sicily yet to be fought.
Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Crowe and 
Major J.H.W. Pope of the Royal Canadian 
Regiment consult a map at Piazza 
Armerina, Sicily, 17 July 1943.
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On 17 July British units in 
Eighth Army followed up Axis units 
falling back into the outpost zone 
of their main battle line positions.88 
In the Canadian sector, Group Ens 
abandoned the high ground north 
of Piazza Armerina leaving behind 
bobby-trapped craters and mines to 
cover their escape. Third Canadian 
Infantry Brigade took over the 
division’s improvised truck fleet and 
continued the pursuit up Highway 
117 to Enna. That afternoon they 
discovered that the enemy had only 
backed up a few kilometres to the 
cluster of hills covering the fork where 
Highway 117 bears northwest to 
Enna and a provincial road branches 
off northeast to Valguarnera. New 
Brunswick’s Carleton and York 
Regiment was riding atop Three 
Rivers Regiment Sherman tanks 
when the fight started. The New 
Brunswickers jumped clear and both 
went into action against a well-armed 
enemy backed again by artillery and 
mortars. Three Rivers’ “B” Squadron 
won a close range gun fight against 
a Livorno Division detachment west 
of the highway compelling crews to 
abandon three Italian light tanks, two 
towed 76 mm anti-tank guns and a 
self-propelled gun. The Italians fell 
back to the main German position 
sited on three hills commanding 
Highway 117-Valguarnera Road 
fork in the area known locally as 
Grottacalda. The Carleton and Yorks 
and the West Nova Scotia Regiment 
were about to attack the main position 
when General Simonds halted 
the proceedings in the afternoon. 
Simonds gathered his brigade and 
supporting arms commanders 
together for a conference.89 
Simonds and his staff stil l 
believed that ahead of them laid the 
same battalion-sized rearguard from 
Hermann Goering Division that they 
chased out of Grammichele, identified 
as Battlegroup Hahm. The Canadians 
appreciated how after Grammichele 
the enemy broke contact and fell 
back some 30 kilometres to Piazza 
Armerina. As they drew closer to 
Enna the Germans backed up more 
deliberately and violently, reinforced 
by more Italian infantry, tanks, and 
artillery.90 Simonds and his staff 
believed that 1st Canadian Division 
threatened the fault line between 15th 
Panzer Grenadier Division to the west 
and the Goering Division main body 
to the east. At that point the Canadian 
mission still centred on blowing 
through this nuisance rearguard 
and pressing ten kilometres further 
to intercept 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division at the major road junctions 
at Enna and Leonforte. Simonds 
therefore abandoned his road-bound 
advance in column and split the 
division into two. Brigadier Howard 
Penhale’s 3rd Brigade was to mount 
back up in trucks and drive on Enna 
under cover of darkness, “ready 
to debus and engage the enemy as 
soon as contact was made.” The 
divisional artillery hitched up to 
follow them.91 Brigadier Howard 
Graham was to march 1st Brigade 
northeast across country, capture 
Valguarnera and encircle Battlegroup 
Hahm. Valguarnera, perched on 
an Erei mountain outcropping 
overlooking the Dittaino River valley, 
was the key. From there a secondary 
provincial road ran due north 
across the broad valley to Leonforte. 
British troops clear a house in Centuripe, 
Sicily.
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After 1st Brigade cut off the enemy 
rearguard and secured a base at 
Valguarnera, Brigadier Christopher 
Vokes’ 2nd Brigade would strike 
across the Dittaino Valley and seize 
Leonforte.92 Leonforte stands on an 
equally imposing outcrop on the 
Dittaino Valley’s north side and 
carries Highway 121 connecting Enna 
to Catania through its narrow main 
streets. Controlling the Valguarnera-
Enna-Leonforte triangle would 
certainly block west to east traffic, 
but as the Canadians soon found out, 
15th Panzer Grenadier Division was 
already in the triangle with orders to 
stand and fight.
That night both sides were in 
for a shock. The Royal 22e Régiment 
led 3rd Brigade’s motorized rush 
towards Enna while 1st Brigade 
units set off on their fateful night 
march. At first, things seemed to 
go very wrong. The Van Doos met 
a wall of fire almost immediately 
at the Grottacalda fork. They leapt 
from their trucks and went into 
action. Not only was the road to Enna 
solidly barred, but German panzer 
grenadiers emerged from the fire-lit 
darkness to counterattack.93 At the 
same time, 1st Brigade’s battalions 
disappeared into night shrouded 
hills south of Valguarnera. Short 
range No.18 radio sets lost contact 
in the steep hills. The same rugged 
terrain prevented tanks and tracked 
Bren carriers from following the 
lead companies with more powerful, 
vehicle mounted No.22 radio sets. 
Nevertheless by morning on 18 July 
the Hasty Ps emerged from the hills 
overlooking Valguarnera and cut the 
road between it and the main German 
position at the Grottacalda fork.94 
By morning on 18 July the picture 
became clearer to General Simonds. 
In front of his division stood no 
Hermann Goering rearguard but 
most or perhaps all of Karl Ens 
104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 
tanks from 215 Panzer Battalion, 
substantial German artillery and 
supporting Italian detachments. 
Partly by accident and partly by 
design Simonds’ simultaneous night 
attack on Enna and Leonforte turned 
into an encirclement action around 
Battlegroup Ens. In the early morning 
of 18 July the Van Doos fixed the 
attention of two battalions of Group 
Ens at the Grottacalda fork. The 
West Nova Scotia Regiment marched 
wide out to the west to hook behind 
the enemy while the Carleton and 
Yorks attacked hard on their east 
wing supported by nearly all the 
divisional artillery.95 The Germans 
at the Grottacalda fork got little help 
from their artillery and headquarters 
area around Valguarnera. That same 
morning the Hasty Ps ambushed 
convoys carrying infantry and 
artillery reinforcements to the 
Grottacalda position and fought 
off German counterattacks to re-
open the route. The Royal Canadian 
Regiment arrived later, right around 
the time the Hasty Ps ran low on the 
ammunition. The Royals thus took 
over the job of separating Group 
Ens’ base at Valguarnera from their 
forward battalions.96 Group Ens had 
no choice but to withdraw in broad 
daylight down secondary farm 
tracks, blowing up precious oil and 
fuel dumps that could not be carried 
along. The next day General Rodt 
reported up the German chain of 
command that his division was under 
heavy pressure and that “another 
strong enemy formation (1½ - 2 
divisions) took Valguarnera.”97 Later 
he admitted that “Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment 104 was maneuvered out of 
position and turned from the east.”98 
F i g u r e s  c o n c e r n i n g  A x i s 
casualties are difficult to verify with 
certainty. A total of 73 Italian and 
250 German prisoners were rounded 
up around the two sites over two 
days.99 This first major Canadian 
roundup of German prisoners--
many of whom were forthcoming 
with information--helped to fill in 
Eighth Army’s picture of enemy 
locations and intentions. Clearly 
15th Panzer Grenadier Division had 
Canadian Sherman tanks prepare for an 
attack east of Enna.
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been intercepted. Estimates of enemy 
dead and wounded left on the field 
range from 180 to 240. At a minimum 
Battlegroup Ens lost over 400 of 
its German fighting troops around 
Valguarnera. Canada lost 40 men 
killed and 105 wounded.100 Casualty 
figures mattered in the days to come. 
The Canadian action around 
Valguarnera on 18 July provided 
the first hard intelligence on enemy 
locations in central Sicily even if their 
intentions remained unclear. That 
same day 60 kilometres to the east, 
Italian and German troops violently 
counterattacked 13th British Corps 
on the open Catania Plain.101 These 
attacks checked the British advance 
towards Catania but exposed German 
and Italian troops to British artillery 
fire directed by observation posts 
on Primosole’s heights and forward 
observers with the leading troops. By 
then both sides deployed substantial 
numbers of heavy guns around the 
eastern half of the Catania Plain and 
movement across it required great 
effort and sacrifice.102 Eighth Army 
closely watched 30th Corps and 
especially 51st Highland Division’s 
thrust through the perceived weak 
point on western end of the Catania 
Plain around Gerbini. The Highland 
Division remained the only Eighth 
Army formation not in contact with a 
major enemy force and Montgomery 
hoped it still might reach Mount Etna 
and outflank the Catania position.103 
The Canadian mission was to keep 
15th Panzer Grenadier Division from 
interfering. 
 On the afternoon of 18 July, 
before the battle of Valguarnera 
finished, Simonds called Canadian 
commanders and staff together to 
adapt to the new situation. German 
prisoners confirmed that 15th Panzer 
Grenadier Division planned to 
fall back on and possibly through 
Leonforte.104 Continuing northwest 
to Enna was pointless now that the 
Canadians were in close contact 
with 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 
retreating north to Leonforte right 
in front of them. At Valguarnera 1st 
Canadian Division got a hand inside 
15th Panzer Grenadier Division’s 
belt and could not afford to let go. 
The task would not be easy. Between 
Valguarnera and Leonforte lay 15 
kilometres of rolling hills covered 
in post-harvest grain stubble and 
devoid of concealment. The Dittaino 
River flood plain runs west to east 
like a moat in front of the towering 
hill mass crowned by Leonforte and 
Assoro. From those natural fortress 
towns German artillery observers 
called down long range artillery fire 
on anything they could see. Given 
time German and Italian engineers 
could add enough manmade defences 
to make the position very dangerous 
if not impregnable. The Canadians 
had no intention of granting the 
enemy that time.105 
The 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade attacked across the wide 
Dittaino Valley chasm that night 
using darkness to mask their 
approach. The rest of the division 
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held firm shoulders at Valguarnera 
until US 1st Division cleared Enna to 
the west. The 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division lunged across the Dittaino 
Valley floor 35 kilometres west of 
their sister 51st Highland Division 
pressing towards Gerbini. To help 
fill in the massive gap in between 
General Leese placed Brigadier Roy 
Urquhart’s independent 231st British 
Malta Brigade under Canadian 
command. By 19 July, 231th Malta 
Brigade captured Raddusa and 
pressed into the Dittaino Valley 
ten kilometres east of the Canadian 
thrust.106 
So began the attack by the 
reinforced 1st Canadian Division 
against the Axis main battle line’s 
inland hinge, even if no one in the 
Allied camp understood it as such on 
19 July. During the next 48 hours all of 
Eighth Army clashed with the enemy 
along the Axis main battle line. To 
the east at Catania 13th Corps faced 
more Axis “counter-attacks which 
included hostile tanks.” In the centre 
51st Highland Division crossed the 
Dittaino River at Sferro and Gerbini 
but met “stiff opposition.” German 
counterattacks across the open 
Catania Plain proved costly as did 
British attacks. Eighth Army reported 
the Germans “are fighting fiercely…
have suffered very heavy losses in 
dead during the day.”107 They may 
have, but the Axis line also stabilized 
and thickened as reconstituted and 
re-organized Italian units linked up 
under command of General Hube’s 
German headquarters. Livorno 
Division’s re-constituted 34th 
Regiment, Napoli Division’s 76th 
Regiment, the 16th Corps artillery 
and miscellaneous Blackshirt and 
surviving mobile group units took 
station amid German units holding 
the line between Leonforte and 
Catenanuova. The Italian presence 
created a mostly continuous front that 
enabled German troops, guns and 
tanks to concentrate on commanding 
heights and road junctions along 
the main battle line.108 Italian units 
still had teeth too. The British 231st 
Brigade’s 19 July battle at Raddusa 
Station was fought entirely against 
Livorno Division troops. Even though 
the Italians had “low morale and no 
rations” they still checked 231st 
Brigade’s advance beyond Raddusa 
Station onto the Dittaino Valley floor. 
Italian artillery and dual purpose 
light and heavy anti-aircraft guns 
swept the rolling hills at long range.109 
A l l i e d  r e p o r t s  f r o m  t h i s 
period contain surprise bordering 
on disappointment at the Axis 
willingness and capacity to stand and 
fight in Sicily. By D+10 the picture of 
new Germans arrivals and the number 
of Italians remaining in the fight 
grew clearer. By 18 July American 
troops had taken over 25,000 Italian 
prisoners. British and Canadian 
troops had taken 29,000 prisoners 
of which something over 1,000 were 
German.110 That left 135,000 Italian 
soldiers in the field blended with 
a German ground force that had 
grown to about 60,000 troops. The 
Germans maligned their allies, but 
Italian units had repeatedly blocked 
and delayed Allied units advancing 
inland, effectively covering the flow 
of German units into the main battle 
line. In fact, Italian units were critical 
to the defence as Allied intelligence 
staff predicted they might be before 
the campaign began in May: 
The Italian Army has proved that it 
can conduct itself with credit in close 
country where it is fighting behind 
prepared defences, with alternate 
positions in the rear or on its flanks 
and in a situation where there is 
small danger of encirclement. It is 
moreover commonplace that Italian 
units fight with greater tenacity 
when stiffened by Germans in the 
conditions described.111 
The estimate proved extraordinarily 
accurate.
Sergeant Russell McPhee, Royal 
Canadian Engineers, talks to General 
Bernard Montgomery, commander 
of British Eighth Army, and Major-
General Guy Simonds, commander of 1st 
Canadian Division, August 1943.
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On 19 July most of the 200,000 
Axis troops still in action were on 
or near their main battle line in 
northeast Sicily threatened by only 
three British, one Canadian, and 
one US division. The other four US 
divisions mopped up isolated Italian 
garrisons in western Sicily and closed 
in on Palermo. They could not turn 
fully eastward to join the battle for 
another week.112 Eighth Army’s 
three British divisions were solidly 
blocked by the equivalent of one 
Italian and two German divisions 
across the Catania Plain. Eighth 
Army intelligence realized that 
General Hube’s 14th Panzer Corps 
Headquarters was ashore and that 
“the enemy is far from selling out on 
his remaining bridgehead in Sicily 
with the great natural advantages of 
the Etna position and the defensive 
line he holds in front of it.”113 
Only on the far left in the Canadian 
sector at Leonforte did any prospect 
remain to strike an enemy weak point. 
The 1st Canadian Division operated 
in the only sector on Eighth Army’s 
front where the defenders had just 
arrived in their main defensive zone. 
Battlegroup Ens was still very lethal 
and backed by more German and 
Italian artillery than ever before, 
but they needed time to properly 
prepare their defence. Instead, 
during two successive days and 
nights, 1st Canadian Division pressed 
through Axis outpost positions on 
the valley floor before the enemy 
could blow all the bridges.114 “In 
their hasty withdrawal the enemy 
had been forced to leave behind 
considerable weapons, ammunition 
and equipment.”115 
The Germans gave up the valley 
floor quickly but demonstrated 
their desire and ability to hold the 
Leonforte-Assoro mountain fortress 
with artillery fire. They rendered 
vast swaths of the valley floor 
uninhabitable. Long range 170 mm 
guns reached all the way across the 
valley to Valguarnera and struck 
among 1st Royal Canadian Horse 
Artillery as the regiment moved its 
guns forward.116 By 20 July it was 
clear that the Germans would not 
give up their positions without a 
major fight. Major-General Simonds 
issued orders for the whole division 
to deploy. His problem was that 
pressing the division ten kilometres 
across the shell swept valley to 
Leonforte exposed long flanks to an 
enemy force known to have tanks. 
To the west Simonds solved the 
problem by linking up with 1st US 
Division at Enna. To shield the more 
open and dangerous eastern wing 
Simonds sent Brigadier Penhale’s 
3rd Brigade to join 231st Malta 
Brigade. Together they spread their 
six infantry battalions each with some 
400 riflemen across the 15 kilometre 
gap along the valley floor between 
them and 51st Highland Division to 
the east.117 
 Simonds concentrated the 
rest of the division on the enemy 
force waiting for them at Leonforte 
and Assoro. On 21-22 July, 104th 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s one 
Italian and three German battalions 
defending Leonforte and Assoro 
were enveloped by four Canadian 
battalions. Both Axis and Canadian 
forces included artillery, tanks, 
mortars, heavy machine gun, and 
anti-aircraft units making the battle 
a remarkably equal contest. Colonel 
Ens’ Panzer Grenadiers fought well 
but were nearly surrounded and 
badly shot up in the twin actions 
Sherman tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment cross the Dittaino Valley.
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which constitute Canada’s most 
impressive feats of arms in Sicily. 
German prisoners and captured 
reports reveal that 104th Regiment 
lost an estimated 722 officers and men 
killed, wounded, and captured as of 
21 July, not counting the heaviest 
fighting at Leonforte on 22 July; 
335 German and Italian prisoners 
went into the cage between 21 
and 23 July. By 23 July Canadian 
intelligence staff predicted that “we 
must expect a re-organization of the 
Regt [104th] anytime now.”118 Axis 
forces scrambled to plug the hole 
in their line, although General Rodt 
questioned the value of holding 
the hinge at Agira after the vital 
Leonforte-Assoro fortress fell and 
“because of the losses suffered” 
there.119 Other 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division units and parts of the newly-
arriving 29th Panzer Grenadier 
Division deployed around the rupture 
to contain the Canadian advance. 
The 29th Division’s commander 
was informed that he must aid 
15th Panzer Grenadier Division, 
“which had been decimated by 
heavy losses during the first round 
of fighting.”120 German desperation 
to stop a Canadian breakthrough 
created opportunities for Allied 
air forces. American and British 
fighter-bombers flying from Gela and 
Pachino attacked 29th Division units 
rushing to the front in large daylight 
truck convoys.121 Captured telephone 
transcripts reveal how the raids 
caused “considerable casualties…
considerable loss of vehicles.”122 In 
total even though the Axis main 
battle line held firm at Catania on 23 
July and was not yet threatened on 
the northern wing, its centre hinge 
was in trouble. 
On 23 July, General Simonds 
turned 1st  Canadian Division 
eastward on to Highway 121 in 
readiness to attack the flank of the 
main German line on the Catania Plain. 
That same day Allied intelligence 
staff pieced together that 29th and 
15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions were 
massing north of Leonforte with 28th 
Aosta Division.123 The 1st US Division 
fought on towards Nicosia to help 
but faced a large Italian and German 
force northwest of Enna and could 
not arrive for days.124 Meanwhile 
the Canadians prepared to meet 
a German counterattack to retake 
Leonforte. Counterattack or not, 
German and Italian units occupied 
the high ground north of Leonforte in 
force, overlooking the Canadian route 
east towards Agira.125 Axis troops 
also benefited by retreating east along 
Highway 121 towards Italian and 
Hermann Goering Division units at 
Agira, Regalbuto, and Catenanuova. 
In consequence Canada’s Sicily 
battlefield fundamentally changed. 
Unti l  23  July ,  the  Canadians 
attacked enemy forces isolated from 
A patrol from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry enters Agira, 28 July 1943.
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neighbouring units. Valguarnera 
and Leonforte-Assoro typified those 
days and earned the grudging respect 
of their German opponents who 
complained that Canadian and 
British “fieldcraft (Indianerkrieg) 
superior to our own troops. Very 
mobile at night, surprise break-ins, 
clever infiltrations at night with 
small groups between our strong 
points.”126 After 23 July, enemy units 
deployed north and east of Leonforte 
dug in close enough to each together 
to provide mutually supporting 
observation and fire.127 The nature of 
the fighting changed according. The 
Saskatoon Light Infantry war diary 
recorded that day that “the first flush 
of attack is over and now the division 
is settling in to a hard grind.”128
As the Canadians began their 
drive into the buckling Axis hinge 
the rest of Eighth Army fought off 
German counterattacks across the 
Catania Plain. Most of Seventh US 
Army was still clearing western 
Sicily, entering Palermo with great 
fanfare on 22 July and Trapani 
the next day. On 23 July Generals 
Montgomery, Patton, and Alexander 
designed plans for both Allied armies 
to assault the Axis force in concert. 
Eighth Army shifted from pursuing 
an evacuating enemy to preparing 
a deliberate offensive to destroy 
the German-Italian force dug in 
before them. General Montgomery 
began marshalling men, artillery, 
and shells for Operation Hardgate. 
Eighth Army staff arranged to bring 
their reserve British 78th Infantry 
Division from North Africa through 
central Sicily and secretly stage it 
south of Catenanuova where the 
Dittaino River spills out onto the 
Catania Plain. There Montgomery 
prepared his main attack to break 
the enemy line through to Adrano 
at the foot of Mount Etna. To the 
east 13th Corps and the Royal Navy 
would launch feint attacks on the 
heavily defended east end of the line 
at Catania. Allied air forces prepared 
fighter bomber and medium bomber 
strikes against the string of fortified 
towns and cities overlooking the 
Catania Plain.129 To the north Patton 
would open Palermo as his new main 
supply base, bring ashore his reserve 
9th US Infantry Division from Africa 
and wheel his army east towards 
Axis divisions assembled north of 
Leonforte.130 Only then would the 
Allies deploy ten divisions to attack 
the equivalent of four German and 
three Italian divisions. But these 
preparations demanded time. US 
engineers needed time to repair 
damaged port facilities at Palermo 
and to move American men and 
machines from western Sicily to the 
east to join the lonely 1st US Division 
fighting alongside the Canadians. 
Eighth Army’s three British divisions 
were exhausted and needed to rest 
and absorb replacements. The British 
also needed time to stockpile artillery 
shells necessary for the coming 
reckoning, but the balance of their 
trucks were only scheduled to land 
in Syracuse on 24 July.131 
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The forces, weapons, ammunition 
and supplies necessary for Operation 
Hardgate would not be ready until 
late July. Until then 1st Canadian 
Division and its attached Malta 
Brigade were the principal weapon 
of the entire Allied force on Sicily. 
Their mission was to attack eastward 
along both sides of the Dittaino River, 
either rolling up the flank of the main 
Axis defence line or forcing enemy 
troops to shift inland to stop them. 
Montgomery expected the latter 
thereby thinning the main Catania 
positions prior to Eighth Army’s 
main assault from Catenanuova to 
Adrano scheduled to begin at the end 
of the month.132 In this context the 
reinforced Canadian division opened 
a week-long battle for the Dittaino 
Valley. The Canadian 1st and 2nd 
Brigades and 231st Malta Brigade 
attacked along the north side from 
Nissoria to Agira and Regalbuto. 
On the south side 3rd Canadian 
Brigade was reinforced by spare 
beach organization troops from the 
Royal Marines and the Hampshire 
Regiment no longer needed at the 
shore line. Together they attacked 
an Italian and German pocket 
holding south of the Dittaino River 
around Mount Scalpello overlooking 
Catenanuova.133
That last week of July was 
Canada’s toughest and costliest 
of the campaign. Every move the 
Canadians made brought down 
observed mortar and artillery fire. 
On the north side of the Dittaino 1st 
and 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigades 
backed by Three Rivers Regiment 
tanks and the divisional guns fought 
a grim struggle for the ridges between 
Nissoria and Agira while the Malta 
Brigade threatened Agira’s southern 
approaches. At first, General Rodt 
pulled much of Colonel Ens’ 104th 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment out of 
the Canadian path, apparently to 
rest, but Canadian pressure towards 
Agira forced him to throw it back into 
the fight.134 Two or three battalions 
from 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, 
tank, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft 
batteries and the last of 4th Livorno 
Division joined in the attritional 
battles around Agira.135 At the same 
time 3rd Canadian Brigade hauled 
weapons and ammunition by pack 
mule to conceal their approach across 
the bald and exposed south side of 
the Dittaino River before battling 
their way on to Monte Scalpello 
overlooking Catenanuova.136 German 
fortress and Goering Division troops, 
along with parts of 54th Napoli 
Division gave up the prominent 
ridge with great reluctance. From 
24 to 29 July the Canadians cleaved 
a wedge into the seam between 
the two wings of the Axis line. 
Battle Group Ens was battered and 
sent to a rest area near Troina and 
reconstituted with personnel from 
a German construction battalion 
and 800 “Slavs” from the divisional 
replacement battalion.137 The Livorno 
Division gave up hundreds of 
prisoners and an unknown number 
of dead. Private C. Otto Meyer from 
29th Panzer Grenadier Division sent 
to join the battle west of Agira wrote 
to his parents: 
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All of us here have prepared 
ourselves to accept our fate, never 
to enter Germany or Italy again. Now 
already only 1/3 of our company 
remains. All others killed, wounded, 
missing, captured or ill. Daily we 
become less. I always say to myself, 
it can’t be worse anyplace than it is 
here at the present.138 
A few days before, in the midst 
of Canada’s battle for the Dittaino 
Valley, King Vittorio Emmanuelle 
III dissolved Benito Mussolini’s 
Fascist Government in Rome and 
arrested Mussolini. Adolf Hitler 
found out late on 25 July. Earlier in 
the day, Hitler’s headquarters seemed 
satisfied that German reinforcements 
to Sicily made them strong enough 
in tanks and artillery to hold the 
line until rough fall weather made 
Allied landings anywhere else in 
the Mediterranean unlikely. That 
view turned upside down when 
reports arrived that evening about 
Mussolini’s arrest. Hitler ordered 
German troops to abandon Sicily 
immediately and pulled additional 
German divisions from the Atlantic 
Wall and Russian front to garrison 
Europe’s Mediterranean coastline. 
“This [on the eastern front] must be 
given away. It’s absolutely clear: Here 
[southern Europe] we’re dealing with 
critical decisions. If worst comes to 
worst, even more must be withdrawn 
from the East.”139 
Orders from Berlin became the 
Operation Lehrgang evacuation 
plan issued in Sicily two days later. 
By then Kesselring convinced Hitler 
not to abandon Sicily immediately 
because Mussolini’s arrest did not 
cause Italy’s immediate surrender. 
Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio’s 
provisional government kept up a 
façade alliance with Germany even as 
they negotiated peace with the Allies. 
Kesselring predicted that chaos 
would reign when Italy officially 
surrendered and believed German 
and Italian troops must continue 
fighting in Sicily to delay Italy’s 
defection to the Allies and buy time 
for Germany’s takeover of southern 
Europe.140 The 14th German Panzer 
Corps and a dwindling number 
of Italians still fighting with them 
were thus ordered not to leave Sicily 
until forced off by “enemy action.” 
Forward units were informed that 
“the present position must be held 
at all costs.”141 German and Italian 
units remained dug-in and prepared 
to stand on 31 July when the entire 
Allied 15th Army Group backed 
by powerful naval and air forces 
attacked them everywhere at once. 
In 1st Canadian Division’s area 
at the centre of the Axis line the 
fighting never stopped. On 31 July, 
1st and 2nd Canadian Brigades 
and 231st Brigade attacked the 
Goering Division’s inland wing 
at Regalbuto while 3rd Brigade 
stormed the dry Dittaino River 
bed and into Catenanuva officially 
opening Eighth Army’s Operation 
Hardgate. Behind the Canadians 
came the fresh and veteran 78th 
British Infantry Division. Together 
they fought along rock-strewn, fire-
swept slopes to Centuripe and the 
Salso Valley northeast of Regalbuto. 
The Germans counterattacked with 
Goering Division tanks and engineers 
and 3rd Parachute Regiment brought 
west from Catania to stop the 
breakthrough. The 382nd Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment shifted to the 
Salso Valley to stop 2nd Canadian 
Brigade from linking up with the 
Americans. The Germans transferred 
pieces from every major formation in 
Sicily to hold their collapsing centre 
in front of the Canadians in late July 
and early August, weakening those 
forces along the British and American 
paths towards Messina. Kesselring 
warned Hitler on 2 August that “if 
it is not possible to hold the pivot 
Regalbuto” then he must pull back 
into the final evacuation bridgehead. 
Kesselring’s fears materialized when 
the Canadians and 78th Division 
pressed across the Salso Valley and 
cut the Axis line at Adrano.142 By then 
the whole of Eighth Army joined in 
the general offensive and clawed into 
The Pipes and Drums of the Seaforth 
Highlanders perform in Agira, 30 July 
1943.
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the volcanic hills at the foot of Mount 
Etna. On the northern wing of the 
Axis line Lieutenant-General Omar 
Bradley’s 2nd US Corps attacked 
the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division 
and the comparatively intact 26th 
Assietta and 28th Aosta Divisions 
while the 1st US Division, joined by 
the fresh 9th Division, fought what 
General Patton saw as the largest 
and “most desperate American battle 
of the campaign” at Troina.143 When 
it was over General Rodt reported 
1,600 additional casualties on top 
of those lost in the Canadian sector 
in late July. The 4,000 man fighting 
component of 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division that started the campaign 
was wrecked.144 
Two days after Adrano and 
Troina fell, 1st Canadian Division was 
pulled out of the line to rest and re-
constitute for the follow-on mission 
to invade the Italian mainland. At 
the same time German units formed 
rearguards and began their infamous 
retreat to Messina. They withdrew up 
coastal strips on either side of Monte 
Etna, laying mines, blowing and 
booby-trapping bridges, and flooding 
tunnels behind them making pursuit 
by Allied land forces impossible. 
Under the cover of powerful anti-
aircraft artillery German troops 
escaped across the Straits of Messina 
in barges and small engineer ferries at 
a dozen places along the narrow gap 
between Sicily and mainland Italy. 
The Royal Canadian Air Force did 
what it could to stop them alongside 
Allied aircrew from a dozen nations. 
Three Wellington bomber squadrons 
from RCAF 331 Wing flew 350 sorties 
over the Straits, losing five planes to 
anti-aircraft fire along with 25 of the 
30 men who crewed them.145
On 17 August the guns finally 
fell silent on Sicily. The Allies 
accomplished all they had set out 
to and in only 38 instead of the 
expected 42 days. Sicily’s airfields 
and ports became bases for Allied 
planes and ships, Axis control of 
Mediterranean shipping routes 
was broken, Mussolini was gone, 
peace negotiations with Italy were 
underway, and most importantly 
This air photo shows the German evacuation from Sicily across the Strait of Messina in progress. The Italian mainland is at the lower 
right and the beaches north of Messina are at the upper left. The small white streaks on the surface of the water are the wakes of 
vessels making the voyage to the mainland or back.
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nearly one million German soldiers 
were on the move from Russia, 
Germany and northern France to 
the Mediterranean coast of Europe. 
Despite later reflection on what 
more they might have done to stop 
50,000 Germans from escaping Sicily, 
in early August 1943 Allied senior 
commanders were consumed with 
planning the next strategic steps.146 
Their next mission to invade mainland 
Italy cemented the deal whereby the 
Italians not only surrendered but 
actively joined the cause against 
Germany. That mission opened the 
Italian campaign on 3 September 1943 
and diverted 20 percent of German 
military power to the Mediterranean 
theatre. Allied strategic aims of 
assisting Russia and pinning down 
German units in Western Europe 
prior to the invasion of Normandy in 
1944 were well achieved.147 
The Germans struggled to put 
a positive spin on this strategic 
catastrophe to “raise morale and 
confidence at home.” General Hube 
suggested to Marshal Kesselring that 
they must “describe battles in Sicily 
as a big success.” Hube argued that 
evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940 
“was presented to the British public 
as a great success” even though 
the British abandoned their heavy 
equipment. Because the Germans 
managed to ferry some of their 
trucks and tanks off the island then 
“the Sicilian campaign is actually a 
full success.” Hube suggested that 
Germans be told how “in spite of 
tremendous superiority of men and 
material the enemy required six 
weeks to take the island” and his 
troops inflicted casualties on the 
Allies of about “1/3 of the fighting 
strength.” Hube also pushed the 
message that his divisions evacuated 
from Sicily “are now on the mainland, 
ready and able for battle.”148 German 
Pro paganda  Min is te r  Joseph 
Goebbels seems to have followed 
Hube’s recommendations claiming 
in an August radio broadcast that the 
Allies lost 33 percent of their ground 
force on Sicily in addition to 20 British 
warships and thousands of airplanes. 
Goebbels also claimed that only two 
understrength German divisions held 
off 20 Allied divisions in Sicily.149 The 
most enduring myths of the Battle 
for Sicily seem to have originated in 
German propaganda. 
Hube and Goebbels may have 
been right to conceal Husky’s outcome 
from the German people lest they 
abandon hope in Hitler’s war. Among 
the approximately 60,000 German 
soldiers evacuated from Sicily were 
some 19,261 wounded; in addition, 
5,000 were killed and 6,663 taken 
prisoner in the campaign. Given that 
at least half of the 70,000 German 
soldiers on Sicily served in transport, 
service, and headquarters units 
casualty rates in fighting units were 
crippling. German units evacuated 
from Sicily were hollow shells that 
needed thousands of replacement 
soldiers to rebuild. Allied staff 
estimated that Italy’s armed forces 
lost 2,000 killed and 5,000 wounded, 
although those numbers are difficult 
to verify given that the Italian Army 
administrative structure collapsed 
into civil war at the end of Husky. 
It is more certain that 137,000 Italian 
troops were captured and 62,000 
escaped to the mainland. In total, the 
enemy suffered 32,000 German and 
144,000 Italian casualties compared 
to 19,000 of the Allies.150 
German losses in Sicily hampered 
their effectiveness more than they 
cared admit.  The 15th Panzer 
Grenadier Division was the most 
badly crippled. After absorbing three 
replacement battalions and survivors 
from four disbanded battalions the 
division was still short 1,600 men 
from its fighting regiments. It did 
not re-appear on the Italian front 
until October 1943. The 29th Panzer 
Grenadier Division, in action only 
during the second half of the Sicily 
battle, lost 50 percent of its fighting 
strength.151 It was revived with new 
replacements and thrown into the 
counteroffensive against the Allied 
invasion at Salerno in September 1943. 
Afterwards Kesselring complained 
that formations rescued from Sicily 
and hastily rebuilt suffered from 
“the lack of battle experience and 
incomplete training of the young 
reinforcements who, as soon as 
their leader has become a casualty, 
are completely helpless in the face 
of a much better trained enemy.”152 
Kesselring kept these private views 
secret and publicly expressed Hube’s 
version of events that Germany’s four 
Sicily divisions escaped “completely 
fit for battle and ready for service.”153 
C a n a d a ’ s  c o n t i n g e n t  o n 
Operation Husky inflicted its share 
of the cumulative damage that 
broke Fascist power in Rome and 
Axis military power on Sicily. The 
1st Canadian Division faced and 
outfought parts of every major Axis 
formation on Sicily without real 
numerical and firepower superiority 
until August. In partnership with US 
1st Division the Canadians nearly 
destroyed 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Division and had a hand in battering 
29th Panzer Grenadier, 1st Parachute, 
and Hermann Goering Divisions. 
General Oliver Leese, the 30th Corps 
commander, commended Major-
General Simonds and his troops who 
“took up the forefront of the Corps 
battle from Vizzini. For three weeks, 
with the Malta Bde [Brigade] under 
your command, you have fought 
continuously against a stubborn 
German resistance, both by day and 
by night.” General Montgomery told 
the Canadians that “I now consider 
you one of my veteran divisions.”154 
For the first time in the Second World 
War the Canadian Army proved it 
could fight the best formations in the 
German Army and win. The public 
at home noticed. Canadian Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King wrote to 
Simonds: “In Canada the eyes of all 
fixed on SICILY. We know that there 
is heavy fighting ahead. We know too 
28
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that Canadian forces will do honour 
to our country and to themselves. 
Please give all the assurance that our 
hearts are with them, that Canada is 
proud of the decisive courage of her 
army overseas and that Canada will 
not fail her fighting men.”155 
Canadian troops may have 
proved their military value, but their 
story in central Sicily also revealed 
how much death and destruction 
lay ahead before Hitler’s Germany 
gave up its war. American veteran 
infantryman and literary scholar Paul 
Fussell captured North American 
expectations. “At first everyone 
hoped, and many believed, that 
the war would be fast-moving, 
mechanized, remote-controlled, and 
perhaps even rather easy.”156 The 
fighting in Sicily included spells 
of rapid motorized warfare, but 
whenever Axis forces chose to dig 
in and hold ground only firepower 
and hard fighting defeated them. 
Canada paid its share of the blood 
price for Sicily: 1,664 Canadians 
were wounded, 84 were taken as 
prisoners, 1,200 contracted malaria 
and battled illness relating to it for 
the rest of the war if not their lives, 
and 562 men were killed.157 It should 
go without saying that the ugliness of 
victory in Sicily was much exceeded 
by the violence and ruthlessness of 
Nazi German occupation in Europe. 
The fighting had to go on, but the 
liberation of Europe was underway. 
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